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VICTOR H. LI*

A Perspective on Taiwan
Introduction
Even though the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of
China (PRC) has been completed there are still many problems to be resolved. This paper will briefly reexamine the process by which normalization
occurred, and then focus on some of the difficult issues which may arise in the
future. Since the other articles deal with the PRC, this one will focus on
matters relating to Taiwan. The approach adopted will not be that of an
expert on Taiwan affairs, but rather of a lawyer trying to share some concerns
about certain potentially disquieting developments on Taiwan.
i. United States Policy Since 1972
As Mr. Jenkins' article ably documents, the policy question during the past
several years has not been whether the United States should normalize relations with China. That issue was settled when Mr. Kissinger and President
Nixon went to China in 1971 and 1972, respectively. Since that time American policy has been quite consistent: normalization was begun by a conservative Republican president, affirmed by a moderate Republican president, and
completed by a Democratic president. Thus, when President Carter made his
announcement December 15, 1978, one might have been surprised by the
timing, but certainly not by the fact that normalization had finally come.
The point that this should have come as no surprise is stressed because
opponents of normalization in the United States as well as spokesmen for the
government on Taiwan would have to have been politically naive to believe
that the December 15, 1978, actions marked a shift in American policy resulting in the betrayal of Taiwan. If there was a betrayal of Taiwan, which many
would dispute, it occurred in 1971. If these people were surprised by normalization, then the surprise was a result of their own blind refusal to face realities; Taiwan had eight years' notice that normalization would occur.

*Lewis Talbot and Nadine Hearn Shelton Professor of International Legal Studies, Stanford
Law School.
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Thus, the question facing the United States after 1972 was not whether to
normalize, but rather when and on what terms. There was not even much
disagreement over the general outline of the terms. The United States had to
move ahead on normalization of relations with China while, at the same time,
preserving Taiwan's security; that is, to normalize without "abandoning"
Taiwan.'
This result has been essentially achieved. One might have some quarrel
with the Administration about the adequacy of its consultation with Congress, 2 the manner in which the negotiations were carried out, or by the precise timing of the announcement. Congress also may have pushed the President further on the security issue than he would have liked to go. In any event,
the end result was that normalization was carried out without jeopardizing
Taiwan's security or economic well-being.
The Taiwan Relations Act enables all commercial and cultural ties to continue as before.' The substance of United States-Taiwan security relations
will also remain the same even after the termination of the Mutual Defense
Treaty' at the end of 1979. That is, the United States will continue the sale of
defensive arms to Taiwan, and will also strongly object to the use of force in
the Taiwan area. These are essentially the same actions which could have
been expected under the Mutual Defense Treaty.
II. The United States and Taiwan
For the past thirty years the United States has viewed Taiwan as a passive
party, doing essentially what we told it to do. Sometimes we had to tighten the
reins and at other times we had to offer incentives, but control and initiative
were in our hands. This perception of Taiwan, however once correct, is no
longer so.
There appears to be a dynamic internal political movement developing in
Taiwan which may lead to changes on that island. Informed and reasonable
people differ, often sharply, on how change will occur and what the ultimate
outcome will or should be, 5 but there is little disagreement over the fact that,
in the next several years, the process of change in Taiwan will be active and

'See generally Li & Lewis, Resolving the China Dilemma: Advancing Normalization, Preserving Security, 2 INT'L SECURITY 11 (1977).
'See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S.Ct. 533 (1979).

'For a detailed discussion of the legal aspects of United States relations with Taiwan after
derecognition, see Li, De-recognizing Taiwan: The Legal Problems (1977); Li, The Law of
Nonrecognition: The Case of Taiwan, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 134 (1979); V. H. Li, The Future
of Taiwan: A Dialogue (to be published by M. E. Sharpe, Inc.).
'Mutual Defense Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, United States-Republic of China, 6 U.S.T. 433,
T.I.A.S. No. 3178.

'See The Future of Taiwan, supra note 3, chs. II-VI.
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possibly even contentious. Moreover, this process is something over which
neither the United States nor the PRC has much control. And, if changes do
occur, neither the United States nor the PRC is prepared to respond.
Indeed, a strong argument can be made that the major source of potential
friction between the United States and the PRC in the 1980s will be the
Taiwan question. For example, some persons in Taiwan want the island to
become de jure or de facto independent. Without commenting on the desirability or likelihood of this development, let me pose the hypothetical question: if Taiwan moves toward independence, what will be the American response? The answer to this question is not at all clear. The concept of
self-determination has popular appeal, but any support for some form of
independence will conflict with the PRC's fundamental "one-China" principle. The United States then may have to make an enormously difficult moral
and political choice between support for self-determination and a possible
rupture of relations with the PRC.
III. New Political Forces on Taiwan
An important factor in Taiwan's internal politics is that the leadership of
the central government is getting very old. For example, the members of the
Legislature (which is the equivalent of our Congress) and the National Assembly (which meets periodically to elect the president and vice-president)
average well over seventy years of age. Obviously, they will soon be replaced
by a new generation of leaders.
These two national bodies possess a second special characteristic besides
elderly members. More than 90 percent of the members of the Legislature and
95 percent of the National Assembly were elected in 1947. These persons have
not stood for reelection since that time; after all, a representative from
Shanghai could hardly go back to his district and constituents after 1949.
Incidentally, this circumstance explains in part why it is so difficult for the
Taiwan government to cease claiming to be the government of all China.
Such an adjustment, while fully in accord with realities, would remove the
basis of legitimacy for many officeholders in the central government.
The result is that the people on Taiwan, including both the Taiwanese (the
term used to describe persons whose ancestors came from China to Taiwan
over the past several hundred years) and the mainlanders (persons coming
from China to Taiwan after 1945), vote for only a tiny fraction of these
national bodies. In addition, some Taiwanese are dissatisfied because they
constitute 85 percent of the population, yet hold only a small number of
important government and party positions.
The passing of the old generation of leaders, the island's great economic
and educational achievements, and growing international scrutiny have
created a political atmosphere conducive to and demanding of change. It also
may be that so much has changed for Taiwan in the international arena since
1971-expulsion from the United Nations, President Nixon's 1972 visit to the
PRC, normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, the death of Chiang Kai-
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shek, and normalization of Sino-United States relations-that domestic
change is imperative to meet the challenge of international survival, however
unwilling the present leadership is to admit to that need. In any event, there
has been a growing call for a redistribution of political power to more accurately reflect the realities of the island.
The electoral process illustrates how the internal political dynamic is developing. Taiwan has a basically single party system, consisting of the Nationalist Party (KMT) and two other very small parties. In the past, running for
public office was not an effective means by which persons outside the KMT
might attain political power. Several opposition candidates did win occasionally, but the election process was basically dominated by the KMT.
An important change occurred, however, in the 1977 local elections for
provincial, county, and municipal offices. A number of young Taiwanese
politicians, frustrated by the slow pace of their advancement through the
party or bureaucracy, decided to run for public office in opposition to the
KMT. These candidates (often referred to as non-KMT party or opposition
politicians) gained 38 percent of the popular vote, an astounding feat in an
essentially single party state. There were also riots in Chungli and Kaohsiung
over alleged election fraud perpetrated by the Nationalists.
Another election was scheduled to be held on December 23, 1978, for 38
seats (out of approximately 400) in the Legislature and 56 seats (out of approximately 1,200) in the National Assembly. The campaign was lively and
aggressive on all sides, but was suspended after the normalization announcement. The effect of the suspension on internal political developments in
Taiwan is still unclear.
What are some of the possibilities? Here, one can only speculate and provoke thought rather than predict the future. At one extreme, there may be a
crackdown on the opposition by conservative elements within the KMT.
Some such actions may already be taking place. For example, Yu Teng-fa, a
seventy-six-year-old opposition leader from Kaohsiung, was sentenced by a
military court in April 1979 to eight years imprisonment for copying a "subversive" article from Asahi Shimbun and failing to report the activities of an
alleged PRC agent. Yu's supporters claim that the trial was an effort to
harass and intimidate opposition politicians. Of course, whether this assertion is in fact true or false cannot be readily determined by observers in the
United States. Nevertheless, the point is that opponents of the government
may use the Yu case as a rallying point of protest, and this in turn may lead to
more restrictions being imposed by the government. If the crackdown expands in scope or virulence, the image of "Free China" will erode further,
and with this erosion may come a loss of support from the American public
and Congress.
Toward the other end of the spectrum of possibilities is a takeover of
power, gradual or sudden, by Taiwanese political leaders. These persons
clearly desire more control over their own destiny; some may even favor an
independent state of Taiwan. At the same time, they are sophisticated politi-
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cians who know that independence is opposed by the KMT, in part because its
own legitimacy would be undercut, and by the PRC, because such action
would violate the "One-China" principle. With the exception of the Taiwan
Independence Movement, Taiwanese politicians have generally avoided the
term independence, prefering merely that Taiwan be able to act in an independent manner without making a change in the juridical status of the island.
Neither of these two possibilities-a crackdown on the opposition or a
move toward independence-must occur. There are other less drastic and
more likely scenarios. Rather, the point is that developments are taking place
on Taiwan which may substantially change its political situation. These
changes would in turn greatly affect political relations between the United
States and the PRC. At the least, one has to begin thinking about how to cope
with possible future developments on Taiwan. Nonetheless, people both
within and outside the government are not doing so. Once again, we may be
caught unprepared and may be confronted with a situation we would just as
soon have avoided.
IV. Moral Obligations
Finally, a comment on American moral obligations to Taiwan is in order.
Over thirty years ago, in a world that was very different, the United States
provided massive military and other assistance to Taiwan when such assistance was sorely needed. In subsequent years, the United States contributed
greatly to the remarkable economic growth of that island.
At some point, however, the original American commitments to Taiwan
for military protection and economic assistance will have been fulfilled.
Taiwan is not the fifty-first state which must be defended and assisted under
any circumstances and for all time. Nonetheless, in the course of helping to
build a new society on Taiwan, the United States has incurred new obligations to give that society an opportunity to survive and grow.
Taiwan is going through a transition from being the Republic of China
representing all of China to some new and still undefined status. What that
new status should be must be decided by the people on Taiwan. They must
consider the offers being tendered by the PRC. If they feel the offers to be
unsatisfactory, they must seek better terms or search for new solutions. It is
time for Taiwan to take its own problems in hand. If it wishes to continue the
fiction of being all of China, then it has had ample notice that it must stand
alone and face the consequences. If it wishes to reunify with the PRC or
adopt some other status, then it must begin the process of change.

